

DDA SUBJECT FILE COPY

OCA-87-0801

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
		6 Mar 87
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. Director of Logistics		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	


REMARKS

#1 - FOR ACTION: Please prepare draft response.

Return to me for forwarding to OCA.

SUSPENSE: 20 MARCH 1987

STAT



DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
EXA/DDA	Phone No.

8041-102

\* U.S.G.P.O.: 1983-421-529/320

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

STAT

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request from Rep. Steny Hoyer

FROM:

EX0/OCA  
7B24 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO

DATE

6 March 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. EX0/DDA  
7D24 Headquarters

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

EX0/OCA  
7B24 Headquarters

7.

8.

9.

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12.

13.

14.

15.

Jim: Would appreciate someone drafting a response to the attached. Don't worry about format--we'll put in final here.

Thanks a lot.

OCA 87-0801

**OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS****Routing Slip**

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/Legislation		X
3. DD/Senate Affairs		X
4. Ch/Senate Affairs		
5. DD/House Affairs		X
6. Ch/House Affairs		
7. Admin Officer		
8. Executive Officer	X	
9. FOIA Officer		
10. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
11.		
12.		

SUSPENSE

12Mar87

Date

Action Officer: 

Remarks:

ecf 5Mar87


Name/Date

**STENY H. HOYER**  
9th DISTRICT, MARYLAND  
  
DEMOCRATIC STEERING  
AND POLICY COMMITTEE  
  
CO-CHAIRMAN  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

**APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE**  
  
TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE,  
GENERAL GOVERNMENT  
  
LABOR,  
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,  
EDUCATION  
  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

February 26, 1987



STAT

[Redacted]  
Director  
Legislative Liaison  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

STAT

Dear [Redacted]

STAT

Enclosed is a copy of the letter which I received from [Redacted]  
regarding his concern for substandard construction bolts for building  
projects at the Central Intelligence Agency facility.

STAT

I can certainly appreciate [Redacted] concern and I am enclosing the  
bolt he picked up at the site. I would appreciate your checking into  
this situation and providing guidance for my response.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Steny Hoyer".  
STENY H. HOYER

Enclosures

Please respond to:

4351 Garden City Drive  
Suite 625  
Landover, Maryland 20785

**Page Denied**

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**JACK ANDERSON and JOSEPH SPEAR****Counterfeit Bolts Endanger A-Plants**

**S**ubstandard bolts have been found at one U.S. nuclear power plant and may well be in place at others, ready to give way at the first serious vibration or ultra-high temperature. And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is alarmingly relaxed about the danger that the faulty fastener could cause a Chernobyl-like disaster.

The bolts are counterfeits, mostly from Taiwan, Korea and Japan. They look like high-grade bolts and bear false industry markings designating top-quality manufacture. But they are made of substandard metals or are inadequately tempered to withstand stress.

A quality-control official at the commission told our associate Stewart Harris he was reasonably certain that there were no counterfeits in nuclear power plants, because a recent random test had turned up none. Asked how many bolts were actually tested, the official replied: "13."

Further tests will be made on perhaps 30 more bolts taken from three to five power plants, the official said.

We have news for the commission: Counterfeit bolts have already been found in storage at a nuclear power plant. Bill Windt of Texas Bolt conducted laboratory tests on bolts taken from a plant that he said had bought "tons" of substandard steel fasteners. He was told he'd be sued if he revealed the name of the plant, but he was able to tell us the nuts and bolts he tested at his Houston lab did not meet specifications and could fail under such conditions as the extreme temperatures that are common in nuclear cooling systems. The bolts were subsequently discarded.

The substandard fasteners discovered by Windt aren't the only ones that have been palmed off on the nuclear industry. We have also learned that bogus bolts were purchased by PostSeal International, a Connecticut firm that makes butterfly valves for nuclear plants.

We spent weeks poring over Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents for any mention of counterfeit bolts, and found absolutely nothing. But we were told that commission inspectors might not recognize a spurious bolt if they tripped over one.

We presented our evidence to a number of experts in the industry. Their responses were chilling. Tommy Grant of Grant Fasteners in Houston, said: "Frightening."

Frank Akstens, an engineer and editor of Fastener Technology International magazine, said: "The documented evidence you send is appalling testimony on the behavior and shortcomings within the nuclear power industry."

John Cole of Product Risk Reduction Inc. of Westlake, Ohio, said, "I see many of the assumptions and decisions indicated in the [commission's] reports as basic ignorance of the products and the world fastener base."

Charles Wilson of the Industrial Fastener Institute in Cleveland agreed. Some of the engineers who wrote the reports appeared unaware, for example, that bolts that are too hard can be as dangerous as ones that are too soft. If they're too hard, Wilson explained, they won't break loose under extremely high pressure as they're intended to; lacking this safety feature, the entire cooling system could explode.